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TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH-THE BIRTH OF FETAL RIGHTS UNDER
ARKANSAS'S WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE: THE ARKANSAS SUPREME
COURT RECOGNIZES A FETUS AS A "PERSON." Aka v. Jefferson Hospital
Ass 'n, 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001).
I. INTRODUCTION
While fetal rights have been recognized in some areas of the law
for hundreds of years, the first instance of fetal protection under
wrongful death law in the United States did not occur until 1946. Since
then, a majority of jurisdictions have developed laws permitting an
action on behalf of a fetus under wrongful death statutes.2 In 2001, the
Arkansas Supreme Court joined the majority of jurisdictions when it
overruled precedent' and held that a survivor could bring an action on
behalf of a viable fetus under the Arkansas wrongful death statute.4
This note examines the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding in Aka
v. Jefferson Hospital Ass n, in which the court overruled precedent and
recognized a fetus as a "person" under the Arkansas wrongful death
statute. First, the note discusses the tragic facts underlying the Aka case.
Next, the note examines the historical development of fetal rights in
wrongful death actions. The note then addresses the major issues
surrounding fetal death claims, focusing on the inclusion of a fetus
within the definition of "person" and the various tests courts use to
determine whether fetal recovery for wrongful death is allowed.
Reviewing case law, legislation,6 and a voter initiative, the note
examines the legal status of a fetus in Arkansas. The note then analyzes
the Arkansas Supreme Court's reasoning in Aka, indicating the
differences in the reasoning of the majority and minority opinions.
Finally, this note considers the significance of the Aka holding,
suggesting that including "fetus" within the statutory definition of
"person" may have a far-reaching effect on a woman's right to
reproductive choice.
1. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
2. See Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627, 637 n.2, 42 S.W.3d 508, 515
n.2 (2001).
3. Chatelain v. Kelley, 322 Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d 215 (1995), overruled by Aka,
344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508.
4. Aka, 344 Ark. at 641,42 S.W.3d at 518.
5. 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001).
6. Following the submission of the appeal in the Aka case, the Arkansas General
Assembly amended section 16-62-102(a) of the Arkansas Code to include a "viable
fetus" within the definition of "person" for purposes of a wrongful death action. Act of
April 4, 2001, No. 1265, 2001 Ark. Acts 1265 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-
102(a) (LEXIS Supp. 2001)). The Arkansas Supreme Court delivered the Aka decision
on May 10, 2001. Aka, 344 Ark. at 627, 42 S.W.3d at 508.
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II. FACTS
At approximately 7:00 p.m. on December 11, 1995, Evangeline
Aka was admitted for the induction of labor to the Family Practice
Center (FPC), a resident-in-training program at Jefferson Regional
Medical Center (JRMC) in Pine Bluff, Arkansas.7 The University of
Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS) and the Area Health Educa-
tion Center (AHEC) operated the training program via an affiliation
agreement.8 Following Mrs. Aka's admission, Dr. Kimberly Garner
administered Prostin gel and Pitocin to induce labor.9
Twenty-seven hours after her admission to the FPC, Mrs. Aka had
failed to progress in labor, so a hospital employee made an attempt to
contact Dr. Betty Orange, the physician listed as the patient's consult.' °
7. Aka, 344 Ark. at 633, 42 S.W.3d at 512. Evangeline Aka was a thirty-four year
old mother of two sons, ages five and eight. Brief of Appellant at xvii, Aka v. Jefferson
Hosp. Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001) (No. 99-1366). She and her husband,
Dr. Philip Aka, moved to Arkansas from New Jersey in 1995. Brief of Appellee St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. at vii, Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627, 42
S.W.3d 508 (2001) (No. 99-1366) ("Brief of St. Paul"). Mrs. Aka was pregnant prior
to the move, and she had seen a doctor in New Jersey. Id. Her first visit to the FPC was
on November 27, 1995. Id. On December 5, 1995, Dr. Kimberly Garner advised Mrs.
Aka to return to the hospital for the induction of labor on December 11 if she had failed
to spontaneously go into labor. Brief of Appellees Gamer, Higginbotham, and Hill at
2, Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001) (No. 99-1366)
("Brief of Gamer"). Nurse Gail Parker testified that Mrs. Aka appeared to be nervous
about the induction when she checked into the hospital on December 11, 1995. Id.
Parker testified that when she asked Mrs. Aka why she had arrived late to the hospital,
Mrs. Aka told her that she did not want to come to the hospital because she was nervous
about the induction process. Brief of Appellant at 642, Aka (No. 99-1366). Parker also
testified that Mrs. Aka said that "she had a hard time separating herself from her
children that afternoon and when she had hugged them goodbye she had a feeling she
would never see them again and something terrible was going to happen." Id.
8. Aka, 344 Ark. at 633,42 S.W.3d at 512.
9. Brief of Garner at 3, Aka (No. 99-1366). Prostin is the "trademark for
preparations of dinoprostone." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1472
(29th ed. 2000). Dinoprostone is used as an oxytoxic for the induction of abortion as
well as for the induction of labor. Id. at 505. Pitocin is synthetic oxytocin. MICHAEL D.
VOLK & MELVIN D. MORGAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: HANDLING OBSTETRIC AND
NEONATAL CARE § 8.10 (1986). Oxytocin, a hormone produced by the pituitary gland,
stimulates smooth muscle contraction. Id. § 8.09. Oxytocin helps initiate spontaneous
labor, and it is used in obstetrics to induce labor. Id. §§ 8.09-8.10. The Food and Drug
Administration has not approved the use of Pitocin for the elective induction of labor.
Id. § 8.10.
10. Brief of Appellant at xvii, Aka (No. 99-1366). Dr. Orange denied ordering the
induction of Mrs. Aka. Id. at 575. She testified, "[W]hen I learned that I was being used
as the excuse to induce Mrs. Aka it confused me and made me angry." Id.
360 [Vol. 24
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Cheryl Jones, a labor and delivery nurse, determined that Dr. Orange
was off shift and that Dr. Erma Washington was substituting for her."
Jones contacted Dr. Washington at home at approximately 10:00 p.m.
on December 12, 1995.12 Jones testified that Dr. Washington instructed
her to prepare Mrs. Aka for a Cesarean section ("C-section"). 3 Dr.
Washington informed Jones that she was on her way to the hospital,
and she told Jones that she would contact Dr. Orange.' 4 However, Dr.
Washington called back ten minutes later and cancelled the orders for
the C-section. 5 Instead, she ordered medication and instructed the
resident physicians to rupture Mrs. Aka's membrane. 6
Dr. Shane Higginbotham, a first-year resident, attempted to rupture
Mrs. Aka's membrane using an amnio hook, but he was unsuccessful. 7
Dr. Higginbotham called Dr. Washington after he failed to rupture the
membrane, and Dr. Washington told him to call third-year resident Dr.
Randy Hill for assistance.1 8 Dr. Hill subsequently attempted to rupture
Mrs. Aka's membrane with a fetal scalp electrode, but he was also
unsuccessful. 9 When Dr. Hill applied fundal pressure to place the fetal
scalp electrode, Mrs. Aka complained of dyspnea.2° Once the fundal
pressure was relieved, the dyspnea subsided.2' However, ninety minutes
later, "Mrs. Aka sat up in bed and said, 'I cannot breathe."' 22
Dr. Higginbotham testified that Mrs. Aka was "going into
respiratory failure. 23 During Mrs. Aka's respiratory failure, no board-
11. Id. at xviii; Aka, 344 Ark. at 633, 42 S.W.3d at 512.
12. Aka, 344 Ark. at 633, 42 S.W.3d at 512.
13. Id. at 634, 42 S.W.3d at 512.
14. Brief of Appellant at xviii, Aka (No. 99-1366).
15. Aka, 344 Ark. at 634, 42 S.W.3d at 512-13.
16. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 513.
17. Brief of Garner at 3, Aka (No. 99-1366).
18. Aka, 344 Ark. at 634, 42 S.W.3d at 513.
19. Brief of Garner at 3, Aka (No. 99-1366). A fetal scalp electrode is sometimes
used to rupture the membrane by placing the scalp electrode through the membrane
onto the baby's head. Interview with Cynthia N. Frazier, M.D., A Clinic for Women,
in Little Rock, Ark. (June 11, 2001).
20. Aka, 344 Ark. at 634, 42 S.W.3d at 513. Fundal pressure involves applying
pressure on the baby's buttocks in an attempt to lower the baby's head into the mother's
pelvis. Interview with Cynthia N. Frazier, M.D., supra note 19. Dyspnea is shortness of
breath or labored breathing. 2 J.E. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYs' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND
WORD FINDER D-245 (2000).
21. Aka, 344 Ark. at 634, 42 S.W.3d at 513. Using the fetal scalp electrode, Dr.
Higginbotham was ultimately successful in rupturing Mrs. Aka's membrane. Brief of
Garner at 3, Aka (No. 99-1366).
22. Brief of Garner at 4, Aka (No. 99-1366).
23. Aka, 344 Ark. at 634,42 S.W.3d at 513.
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certified obstetrician was present in the delivery room. 24 Dr. Washing-
ton arrived at the hospital during Mrs. Aka's respiratory failure, but no
attempts were made to deliver the baby.25 Mrs. Aka and her unborn
baby died at approximately 1:15 a.m. on December 13, 1995.26 Dr.
Frank Peretti, a pathologist, performed an autopsy on Mrs. Aka and
listed the cause of death as "amniotic fluid embolism. '27 Dr. Peretti's
report indicated that Mrs. Aka's unborn son was a full term infant
weighing eight pounds, fifteen ounces.28 In addition, Dr. Peretti noted
that the baby was "well-developed" and "well-nourished," and
exhibited "[n]o evidence of congenital malformations, natural disease,
trauma or infection.,
29
Six months after the deaths of Dr. Philip Aka's wife and unborn
baby, he made several phone calls to Drs. Washington and Orange, and
on two occasions, he left answering machine messages.30 The doctors
filed complaints with the Pine Bluff police department, and Dr. Aka
24. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 513. Dr. Hill instructed Dr. Higginbotham to scrub for a
possible C-section. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 513. Dr. Higginbotham testified that he did not
have C-section privileges and did not have the skills to perform a C-section even if it
had been necessary to save Mrs. Aka and her baby. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 513. He also
testified that no physician with C-section privileges was there to attend Mrs. Aka while
he was attempting to rupture her membrane. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 513.
25. Brief of Appellant at xviii, Aka (No. 99-1366).
26. Aka, 344 Ark. at 635,42 S.W.3d at 513.
27. Brief of Appellant at xviii, Aka (No. 99-1366). An amniotic fluid embolism
occurs when amniotic fluid and pieces of tissue from the amniotic fluid enter the
mother's blood stream. SCHMIDT, supra note 20, at A-300. When the fluid and tissue
reach the blood vessels, clots lodge in the lungs, resulting in a pulmonary embolism, a
very serious condition which may cause death. Id.
28. Aka, 344 Ark. at 635,42 S.W.3d at 513.
29. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 513. Mrs. Aka's November 30, 1995 ultrasound report
indicated a "full term 'viable single intrauterine fetus' with '[n]o complication
identified."' Id., 42 S.W.3d at 513.
30. Brief of Appellant at xix, Aka (No. 99-1366). Dr. Washington testified that in
one of the phone calls, Dr. Aka said, "Why haven't you called to console us? Did you
know that she had a husband and some children at home?" Id. at 204. Dr. Washington
said the "tone of [Dr. Aka's] voice was threatening and I terminated the call." Id. Dr.
Aka was a college professor at the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff with a Ph.D.
in political science from Howard University. Brief of Garner at 1, Aka (No. 99-1366);
Brief of Appellant at 884, Aka (No. 99-1366). Dr. Aka also obtained a law degree from
Temple University, but he was not licensed to practice law. Brief of Appellant at xvii
n.1, 884, Aka (No. 99-1366).
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was prosecuted for terroristic threatening. 31 Dr. Aka was ultimately
acquitted of all criminal charges.32
On September 6, 1996, Dr. Aka, as the Special Administrator of
the Estates of Evangeline Aka and Baby Boy Aka, filed a medical
negligence complaint against JRMC, 33 Erma Washington, M.D. and
Associates, P.A., 34 Erma Washington, M.D., 35 Betty Orange, M.D.,
Kimberly Garner, M.D., Shane Higginbotham, M.D., Randy Hill,
M.D., and the FPC.36 The complaint alleged medical malpractice by the
physicians and institutions for unnecessarily inducing Mrs. Aka's
labor, failing to discontinue the induction, failing to perform a C-
section, failing to resuscitate Mrs. Aka and the unborn baby, and failing
to obtain informed consent.3 7 In a separate claim, Dr. Aka alleged that
JRMC, AHEC, and AHEC's faculty supervisors failed to train and
supervise residents, proximately causing the deaths of Mrs. Aka and
Baby Boy Aka.38
On July 28, 1997, Dr. Aka filed an amended complaint adding St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company and AHEC faculty supervi-
sors William Freeman, M.D., Herbert Fendley, M.D., and Harvie
Attwood, M.D., as defendants.39 Motions for partial summary judgment
were filed by JRMC and Drs. Higginbotham, Hill, Garner, Attwood,
Fendley, Freeman, and Washington, alleging that the wrongful death
claim filed on behalf of Baby Boy Aka should be dismissed because
31. Aka, 344 Ark. at 635, 42 S.W.3d at 513. Additionally, Drs. Washington and
Orange sued for a restraining order against Dr. Aka on September 13, 1996, in Jefferson
County Chancery Court, and a "consent order of no contact was entered in . . .
November 1996." Brief of Appellant at xix, Aka (No. 99-1366).
32. Aka, 344 Ark. at 635, 42 S.W.3d at 513.
33. Brief of Appellant at xix, Aka (No. 99-1366). On January 27, 1999, JRMC was
dismissed from the suit on the basis of charitable immunity. Brief of St. Paul at x, Aka
(No. 99-1366).
34. Brief of Appellant at xix, Aka (No. 99-1366). Erma Washington, M.D. and
Associates, P.A. was dismissed from the suit on August 18, 1998. Id. at xxi.
35. Id. at xix. On May 23, 1997, Dr. Washington filed a motion for partial
summary judgment, alleging governmental immunity based on her part-time
employment with the residency program. Id. at xx. Dr. Washington also sought
dismissal from the lawsuit as she had no insurance coverage. Id. The motion was denied
without prejudice on July 29, 1997. Id. Dr. Washington renewed her motion on January
2, 1998. Id. On August 10, 1998, Dr. Washington was granted summary judgment based
on her part-time employment status. Id. at xx-xxi.
36. Id. at xix.
37. Id. at xix-xx.
38. Aka, 344 Ark. at 633,42 S.W.3dat 512.
39. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 512. FPC was omitted from the amended complaint because
it had been granted summary judgment. Brief of St. Paul at x, Aka (No. 99-1366).
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the unborn baby was not a "person" under Arkansas law.4 ° On July 29,
1997, Special Judge Phillip Shirron granted partial summary judgment
to all defendants, dismissing the claims of Baby Boy Aka with
prejudice.4
A jury trial began on January 28, 1999, in Pine Bluff, Arkansas.42
The jury found in favor of all defendants on February 17, 1999.43 Dr.
Aka filed a motion for a new trial on March 8, 1999." An order
denying the motion was filed on April 22, 1999. 4"
Dr. Aka appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, challenging the
following: (1) the trial court's order against the estate of Baby Boy Aka
pursuant to Chatelain v. Kelley;46 (2) the trial court's order granting
summary judgment to Dr. Washington and Erma Washington, M.D.
and Associates, P.A.; 47 (3) the jury's verdict as being against the
preponderance of the evidence; and (4) the trial court's evidentiary
rulings excluding an autopsy photograph of Mrs. Aka and related
testimony, evidence of previous complaints, and testimony regarding
a second-year resident who was involved in the incident.48 On May 10,
2001, the Arkansas Supreme Court, citing recent legislative amend-
ments,49 held "that the expressed public policy of the General Assembly
40. Brief of Appellant at xx, Aka (No. 99-1366).
41. Id.




46. 322 Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d 215 (1995), overruled by Aka v. Jefferson Hosp.
Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001). In Chatelain, the court held that a fetus was
not considered a "person" under the wrongful death statute. Id. at 525, 910 S.W.2d at
219.
47. Brief of Appellant at xxi, Aka (No. 99-1366).
48. Aka, 344 Ark. at 636, 42 S.W.3d at 514. At the time of Mrs. Aka's autopsy, Dr.
Peretti testified that he did not see any damage to the placenta. Id. at 646, 42 S.W.3d at
522. However, when shown the photograph of the placenta at trial, Dr. Peretti testified
that there was a laceration of the placenta. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 522. Some testimony
involved prior complaints about AHEC's lack of faculty supervision. Id. at 647, 42
S.W.3d at 522. The trial court allowed the testimony of Nurse Gail Parker, but it
excluded the testimony of Dr. Sterling Roaf, a part-time consultant to the residency
program at JRMC. Id, 42 S.W.3d at 522. The second-year resident, Candace Stewart,
had a doctorate in osteopathy, but she had not passed her medical licensing examination
at the time she discussed the induction procedure and obtained consent from Mrs. Aka.
Id. at 648, 42 S.W.3d at 522-23.
49. Id. at 641, 42 S.W.3d at 518. In 2001, the General Assembly amended title 16,
chapter 62, section 102(a) of the Arkansas Code to include a viable fetus in the
definition of "person" under the wrongful death statute. Act of April 4, 2001, No. 1265,
2001 Ark. Acts 1265 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102(a) (LEXIS Supp.
2001)). In addition, the General Assembly determined "that a deceased viable fetus
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justifies a break from precedent" and overruled Chatelain, thereby
including a viable fetus within the definition of "person" for wrongful
death actions."
III. BACKGROUND
This section begins with a brief discussion of wrongful death
actions at common law. Next, this section examines the historical
development of fetal wrongful death claims, focusing on the issues
courts face when determining whether to allow fetal recovery for
wrongful death actions. Finally, this section examines the development
of fetal wrongful death actions in Arkansas.
A. Wrongful Death Actions at Common Law
At common law, a cause of action for wrongful death did not
exist.5' If the victim or the tortfeasor died, the action died as well.5 2 In
addition, if a victim died, his or her relatives and dependents had no
cause of action for any emotional or financial loss suffered after the
victim's death. 3 In 1808, Lord Ellenborough declared that "in a civil
court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an
injury. 54 Accordingly, under the common law, a tortfeasor whose
victim died owed nothing, while a tortfeasor whose victim survived had
to pay the victim for causing the injury. 5 Finding this inequitable,
England passed the Fatal Accidents Act, or Lord Campbell's Act, in
1846, which established a cause of action for wrongful death. 6 Today,
[was] a decedent for purposes of the probate code." Act of Apr. 18, 2001, No. 1775,
2001 Ark. Acts 1775 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-1-118 (LEXIS Supp. 2001)).
50. Aka, 344 Ark. at 641,42 S.W.3d at 518.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 cmt. a (1979) (citing Baker v. Bolton,
170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808)) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. A wrongful death action
is defined as follows: "A lawsuit brought on behalf of a decedent's survivors for their
damages resulting from a tortious injury that caused the decedent's death." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1606-07 (7th ed. 1999).
52. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125A, at
940 (5th ed. 1984).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 127, at 945 (citing Baker, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1033).
55. Id.
56. Id. Lord Campbell's Act specified "that a [wrongful death] action was for the
benefit of the husband, wife, parent or child." Id. § 127, at 947.
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every American state has a wrongful death statute, most of which were
modeled on Lord Campbell's Act. 7
B. Historical Development of Fetal Wrongful Death Actions
Though England and America established statutory rights of action
for wrongful death, those statutes were often not applied to cases
involving fetal death.58 Dietrich v. Northampton59 was the first reported
American case that addressed the issue of whether a wrongful death
action could be brought for the death of a fetus.60 In Dietrich, a woman
who was between four and five months pregnant slipped and fell on the
defendant's highway, and the fall caused her to prematurely deliver her
baby.61 Ultimately, the premature baby did not survive, and an
administrator brought an action on behalf of the mother for the loss of
her baby.62 In an opinion written by Justice Holmes, the court denied
recovery, reasoning that the unborn child was "not yet in being" and
was merely "a part of the mother at the time of the injury."
' 63
57. Id. § 127, at 945-46.
58. Barbara E. Lingle, Comment, Allowing Fetal Wrongful Death Actions in Arkansas:
A Death Whose-Time Has Come?, 44 ARK. L. REv. 465, 468 (1991).
59. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The infant did survive for ten to. fifteen minutes after birth. Id. at 15. The
court wrote that "no case so far as we know has ever decided that if the infant survived,
it could maintain an action for injuries received by it while in its mother's womb." Id.
The court described the unborn child as "not directly injured, unless by a
communication of the shock to the mother." Id.
63. Id. at 17. The mother did recover damages for personal injuries she sustained
during the fall. Id.
[Vol. 24
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Many years of criticism followed the Dietrich decision,' and
beginning in 1946 with the decision in Bonbrest v. Kotz,65 courts began
to recognize fetal wrongful death claims.66 In Bonbrest, an infant,
through her father and next friend, alleged that she was injured by
doctors when taken from her mother's womb.67 Rejecting common law
precedent, the court allowed the infant to bring an action for injuries
sustained while in the womb.6" The court distinguished Bonbrest from
Dietrich on the grounds that the infant in Bonbrest survived and was
viable when the injury occurred.69 Moreover, the court rejected the
argument in Dietrich that an unborn child was merely a part of the
mother, and further opined that a viable child who had shown its ability
to survive should have standing in court.70 Thus, Bonbrest established
the "born alive" rule, which meant that a viable fetus could recover for
prenatal injuries if it survived birth.7
64. KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 55, at 367-68. In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Boggs, in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, criticized Justice Holmes's opinion that a fetus
was only a part of the mother, writing:
Medical science and skill and experience have demonstrated that at a period
of gestation in advance of the period of parturition the foetus is capable of
independent and separate life, and that, though within the body of the mother,
it is not merely a part of her body, for her body may die in all of its parts and
the child remain alive, and capable of maintaining life, when separated from
the dead body of the mother. If at that period a child so advanced is injured
in its limbs or members, and is born into the living world suffering from the
effects of the injury, is it not sacrificing the truth to a mere theoretical
abstraction to say the injury was not to the child, but wholly to the mother?
56 N.E. 638, 641 (Ill. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (holding there was no action for
prenatal injuries of an infant caused by defendant's failure to properly operate the
elevator carrying the infant's mother), overruled by Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412
(I11. 1953).
65. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
66. See, e.g., Amann, 114 N.E.2d 412 (overruling Allaire, 56 N.E. 638); Leal v. C.C.
Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967) (overruling Magnolia Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 78 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1935)).
67. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 139.
68. Id. at 142-43. The Bonbrest court wrote:
The absence of precedent should afford no refuge to those who by their
wrongful act, if such be proved, have invaded the right of an
individual-employed as the defendants were in this case to attend, in their
professional capacities, both the mother and child. And what right is more
inherent, and more sacrosanct, than that of the individual in his possession
and enjoyment of his life, his limbs and his body?
Id. at 142.
69. Id at 140.
70. Id.
71. Brenda Daugherty Snow, Note, Wrongful Death: A Viable Fetus Is Not a "Person"
Under the Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 307, 310 (1997).
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After Bonbrest, many courts expressly overruled prior holdings and
allowed actions for prenatal injuries.72 In Williams v. Marion Rapid
Transit, Inc.,3 the plaintiff suffered severe medical problems after her
mother fell from defendant's bus and went into premature labor.74 The
Supreme Court of Ohio held that a viable fetus was a "person" under
the state constitution, and as such was allowed to bring an action for
negligent injury.75
Bonbrest and Williams allowed a right of action for a surviving child
who was viable at the time of the prenatal injury, but Verkennes v.
Corniea76 went a step further and allowed a wrongful death action for
a viable unborn child who died as a result of prenatal injuries.77 In
Verkennes, the unborn child died after her mother's uterus ruptured. 8
The court recognized that it was in the minority, but wrote that "[i]t
seems too plain for argument that where independent existence is
possible and life is destroyed through a wrongful act a cause of action
arises under the statutes cited."'79
Similarly, in Stidam v. Ashmore,"° the Ohio Court of Appeals held
that a viable fetus did not have to be born alive to maintain a wrongful
death action for prenatal injuries.81 The court reasoned that allowing
wrongful death actions for infants born alive and disallowing wrongful
death actions for infants born dead would create odd results.82 To
illustrate this point, the court offered a hypothetical situation involving
twins who were simultaneously injured while still in the womb; one
twin survived birth, and the other twin died after birth.83 The court
opined that logic dictated that a cause of action should exist for both or
neither.84 To the Stidam court, it was absurd that one could recover for
injuries unless the injuries were so severe as to cause death.85 However,
72. KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 55, at 368; see, e.g., cases cited supra note 66.
73. 87 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949).
74. Id. at 335. The plaintiff complained that as a result of her prenatal injury she
suffered from heart problems, anemia, spasms, walking difficulties, speech problems,
a nervous condition, and Jacksonian epilepsy. Id.
75. Id. at 340.
76. 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
77. Id. at 841.
78. Id. at 839.
79. Id. at 841.
80. 167 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
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the Second Restatement of Torts and a minority of jurisdictions still
adhere to the "born alive" rule for the wrongful death claims of unborn
children. 6
C. Major Issues Surrounding Fetal Wrongful Death Claims
Courts must consider many issues when determining whether to
recognize a cause of action for the death of a fetus in wrongful death
actions. This section of the note will discuss the following issues: (1)
whether a fetus is considered a "person" under wrongful death statutes;
(2) whether a fetus is considered a "person" in Roe v. Wade;87 and (3)
whether courts follow the "born alive" rule or allow recovery at
viability, regardless of survival. Finally, this section will examine the
development of fetal wrongful death actions in Arkansas.
1. Is the Fetus a "Person"?
For centuries, scholars have debated the issue of whether a fetus
is a "person., 8 Much of the debate has been in the context of abortion
law. 89 Greek and Roman law generally allowed abortions, 0 but any
cause of action for abortion involved the father's right to his
offspring. 9' The Ephesian physician, Soranos, was opposed to Rome's
abortion practices, and only performed an abortion if necessary to save
the life of the mother.92 Similarly, Hippocrates opposed abortion and
included a prohibition of abortion in his Hippocratic Oath.
9 3
86. See RESTATEMENT supra note 51, § 869. The Second Restatement of Torts states,
"(1) One who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liability to the
child for the harm if the child is born alive. (2) If the child is not born alive, there is no
liability unless the applicable wrongful death statute so provides." Id. The following
cases recognize the "born alive" rule: Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962);
Duncan v. Flynn, 342 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Milton v. Cary Med. Ctr.,
538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988); Kuhnke v. Fisher, 683 P.2d 916 (Mont. 1984); Smith v.
Columbus Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 490 (Neb. 1986); Graf v. Taggert, 204 A.2d
140 (N.J. 1964); Witty v. Am. Gen. Capital Distribs. Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987);
Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1969).
87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).




92. Id. Soranos is described as the "greatest of the ancient gynecologists." 410 U.S.
at 130.
93. Roe, 410 U.S. at 131. The Hippocratic Oath states: "I will not give a deadly
drug (pharmacon), not to anyone, when asked, nor will I suggest such a plan of action;
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At common law, a person could legally obtain an abortion before
"quickening."94 Scholars have argued that the lack of a common law
crime for pre-quickening abortions was the result of varying opinions
concerning when an embryo became "'formed' or recognizably human,
or in terms of when a 'person' came into being. 95
In Dietrich v. Northampton,96 the court found that a fetus was not a
"person" recognized by the law as having standing in court.97 However,
the Bonbrest court found to the contrary, questioning why a fetus was
a "person" in some areas of the law, but not in others.98
similarly I will not give a destructive pessary to a woman." University of Saskatchewan,
Program in Classical and Near Eastern Archaeology: The "Hippocratic Oath" (Lewis Stiles
trans.), at http://www.usask.ca/antharch/cnea/DeptTransls/HippOath.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2001). "Pessary" comes "from [the] Greek [word] pessos, an oval stone used in
playing a game like draughts; hence a medicated plug .. . of wool, lint, etc. to be
inserted in the neck of the womb... for the cure of various ailments." Id. at n. 1.
94. Roe, 410 U.S. at 132. Quickening occurs when the mother first notices
movement in her womb. ARLENE EISENBURG ET AL., WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN YOU'RE
EXPECTING 159 (2d ed. 1996). It is described as the "first momentous sensation of life,"
and occurs between the fourteenth and twenty-sixth weeks of pregnancy. Id.
95. Roe, 410 U.S. at 133.
96. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
97. Id.
98. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946). The court asked, "Why
a 'part' of the mother under the law of negligence and a separate entity and person in
that of property and crime? Why a human being under civil law, and a non-entity under
the common law?" 1d. at 140-41. The court noted:
The English word "person" derives from the Latin "persona," and originally
meant "mask." It's (1) a specific kind or manifestation of individual character;
(2) a being characterized by conscious apprehension, rationality and a moral
sense; a being possessing or forming the subject of personality, hence an
individual human being; a particular individual; (3)(c) one as distinguished
emphatically from things or animals.
Id. at 140-41 n.13 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.))
(emphasis in original). Dr. Roy Bowen Ward argues that the most important word to
describe a human being is not "person," but "nephesh." Religious Coalition for
Reproductive Choice, Is the Fetus a Person? The Bible's View, at http://www.rcrc.org/
religion/es2/comp.html (last visited June 26, 2001). The defining characteristic of
"nephesh" is breath. Id. Ward cites the passage from Genesis 2:7, which states: "Then
Yahweh God formed the earth creature of dust from the earth, and breathed into its
nostrils the breath of life; and the earth creature became a living 'nephesh."' Id. Further
illustrating the connection between "nephesh" and "breath," Ward points to Ezekiel 37:8
and the vision of the dry bones: "And as I looked, there were sinews on them, and flesh
had come upon them, and skin had covered them; but there was no breath in them." Id.
Ezekiel 37:10 states that Ezekiel called for breath to come and "the breath came into
them and they lived." Id. Ward concludes that if "nephesh" is the fundamental term for
human being in Hebrew thought, and if a "nephesh" is a creature that breathes, then a
fetus is not a "nephesh," and not a living person. Id.
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In many jurisdictions, a fetus may be protected under criminal
law.99 In addition, a fetus is considered a decedent under the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act.' 0 Some courts have held that because a fetus is
a "person" within other areas of law, it should be considered a "person"
under a wrongful death statute.'0' Conversely, other courts have found
that because the legislature expressly included language that afforded
rights to a fetus in other statutes, an absence of such express language
in a wrongful death statute means that the legislature did not intend for
a fetus to be included within the definition of "person.,
102
2. The Fetus as a "Person" and Roe v. Wade
In Roe v. Wade, °3 the United States Supreme Court declared that a
fetus was not a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. °4 Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the
Constitution "[did] not define 'person' in so many words," even though
there were several references to the word "person" in the
Constitution.' 5 Nonetheless, Justice Blackmun wrote that even though
"person" appeared in the Constitution many times, "the use of the word
99. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B)(i) (LEXIS Supp. 2001). The Fetal
Protection Act of Arkansas provides that a "person" in the criminal statutes is to include
a fetus beyond twelve weeks of development. Michael S. Robbins, Comment, The Fetal
Protection Act: Redefining "Person" for the Purposes of Arkansas' Criminal Homicide
Statutes, 54 ARK. L. REV. 75, 82 (2001). The definition of "person" applies to the crimes
of murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. Id.
100. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 1 (amended 1987), 8A UL.A. 30 (1993).
Section 1 of the Act defines a decedent as "a deceased individual [including] a stillborn
infant or fetus." Id.
101. See, e.g., Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 140-41; see also supra text accompanying note
98.
102. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 132 (Cal. 1977) ("[W]hen the
Legislature determines to confer legal personality on unborn fetuses for certain limited
purposes, it expresses that intent in specific and appropriate terms; the corollary, of
course, is that when the Legislature speaks generally of a 'person'. . . it impliedly but
plainly excludes such fetuses."), overruled on other grounds by Ochoa v. Superior Court,
703 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1985).
103. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
104. Id. at 158. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
105. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
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is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any
assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application.' ' 0 6 The Court
did recognize that states have a "compelling" interest in protecting a
viable fetus, reasoning that a viable fetus could live outside the
mother's womb. 7
Many courts deciding fetal wrongful death cases subsequent to the
Roe decision either ignore the decision or find a way to distinguish it.'0°
The Roe Court stated that a court that disfavors the Roe rule regarding
the definition of "person" could cite the Roe Court's acknowledgement
that other areas of law recognize the rights of the unborn."° In fact,
some jurisdictions use the holding in Roe as authority to protect viable
unborn children."0 Courts have also argued that the holding in Roe
excludes a fetus from the definition of "person" under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but it does not control the definition of "person" in other
areas of law.' However, a few courts have relied on Roe as authority
to assert that a fetus is not a "person" when denying legal status to a
fetus."
2
3. Fetal Recovery: Viability or Live Birth?
In 1946 the Bonbrest court established the "born alive" rule for
recovery." 3 Since then, only a minority of courts have adhered to the
"born alive" rule and required that a fetus must be born alive to
maintain a wrongful death action for prenatal injuries." 4 In Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital,"5 Justice Boggs, in a dissenting opinion, was the first
106. Id.
107. Id. at 163.
108. Snow, supra note 71, at 316.
109. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113. The Roe Court acknowledged that some jurisdictions
allowed stillborn children to maintain an action for wrongful death. Id. at 162. The
Court also recognized an unborn child's right to inherit and right to a guardian ad litem.
Id.
110. See, e.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354, 357 (Ala. 1974);
Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 721 (Ariz. 1985); O'Grady v. Brown,
654 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Mo. 1983).
111. See Summerfield, 698 P.2d at 723 (stating that Roe "neither prohibits nor
compels the inclusion of a fetus as a person for the purposes of other enactments");
O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910 (opining that Roe "does not mandate the conclusion that the
fetus is a legal nonentity").
112. E.g., Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 130-31 (Cal. 1977), overruled on other
grounds by Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1985).
113. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142-43 (D.D.C. 1946).
114. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
115. 56N.E. 638 (Il. 1900).
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to argue that the viability of the fetus at the time of injury, not the live
birth of the fetus, should determine whether a wrongful death cause of
action could be maintained.' 6 Verkennes v. Corniea17 was the first case
to allow a wrongful death recovery for an unborn viable fetus." 8 Some
courts dispense with the viability requirement altogether and allow a
wrongful death cause of action regardless of whether the fetus was
viable at the time of the injury. 19
Opponents of the viability requirement criticize the rule because
it can be difficult to determine exactly when viability occurs, thus
requiring courts to draw an arbitrary line. 2 ° Those who disfavor the
"born alive" rule argue that the viability requirement is a much more
logical place to draw the line for recovery. 2' A majority of jurisdictions
permit a wrongful death action on behalf of a viable fetus.
22
116. See Gary A. Meadows, Wrongful Death and the Lost Society of the Unborn, 13 J.
LEGAL MED. 99, 106-07 (1992); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
117. 38N.W. 2d838 (Minn. 1949).
118. See id. at 840-41.
119. See, e.g., Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955) (holding
that fetus can recover at "quickening"); Jarvis v. Providence Hosp., 444 N.W.2d 236,
238 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that viability at time of injury not required). At
least one jurisdiction has allowed recovery for preconception injuries. See Renslow v.
Mennonite Hosp., 351 N.E.2d 870, 874 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (allowing recovery for
injuries caused by blood transfusion given to mother years earlier), af'd, 367 N.E.2d
1250, 1256 (Ill. 1977).
120. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 134 (Cal. 1977), overruled on other
grounds by Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1985).
121. See, e.g., Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ohio 1985) (noting that
the "born alive" rule would deny an action for a stillborn child, but allow an action
where the child only survives for a few minutes after birth).
122. Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627, 637 n.2, 42 S.W.3d 508, 515 n.2
(2001). A small number of jurisdictions still follow the "born alive" rule. Id., 42 S.W.3d
at 515 n.2. In the Aka decision, the court determined:
Thirty-two jurisdictions permit a wrongful death action on behalf of a viable
fetus. (Of those thirty-two jurisdictions, four permit an action for an unviable
fetus (Connecticut, Missouri, South Dakota, and West Virginia)). Four
jurisdictions permit an action, even for unviable fetuses, but have a live birth
or stillbirth requirement (Louisiana, Maryland, Oklahoma, and Penn-
sylvania). One jurisdiction permits an alternative remedy by allowing an
action for damages resulting in stillbirth caused by negligence (Florida). One
jurisdiction noted in dicta that a wrongful death action might be permitted but
declined to reach the merits on procedural grounds (Utah). Three
jurisdictions prohibit an action for an unborn nonviable fetus but have not
reached the issue of whether a viable fetus may maintain an action (Alaska,
Oregon, and Rhode Island). Four jurisdictions have no case law on the issue
(Colorado, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Wyoming).
Id., 42 S.W.3d at 515 n.2.
2002]
UALR LAW REVIEW
D. The Legal Status of a Fetus in Arkansas
Prior to Aka, the Arkansas Supreme Court had the opportunity to
touch upon the issue of whether a fetus was included within the
definition of "person." Three cases, Carpenter v. Logan,123 Carpenter v.
Bishop, 24 and Meadows v. State, 25 all involved the protection of fetal
rights outside wrongful death law. In 1988 Arkansas voters supported
the protection of fetal rights by passing Amendment 68, which declared
that the public policy of Arkansas was to protect the rights of an unborn
child to the extent allowed by the federal Constitution. 2 6 The Arkansas
Supreme Court was finally asked to determine whether a fetus was a
person under the wrongful death statute in Chatelain v. Kelley.'
2
1. Carpenter v. Logan
Sheryl Carpenter was eight to eight and one-half months pregnant
when she was killed in an automobile accident. 12 8 Investigating officers
located the dead fetus outside Carpenter's body and concluded that the
impact of the crash had forced the fetus through Carpenter's abdominal
wall. 29 Sheryl Carpenter's widower, Cary Carpenter, filed a petition in
probate court requesting an administrator for the estate of the fetus.
3
1
The probate court held that it did not have the authority to order the
administration of the estate of a fetus.' 3' Mr. Carpenter appealed the
decision of the probate court and asked the Arkansas Supreme Court
to determine whether a fetus harmed by negligent acts had a cause of
action against the tortfeasor.112 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed
the order of the probate court, noting that unborn children were not
123. 281 Ark. 184, 662 S.W.2d 808 (1984).
124. 290 Ark. 424, 720 S.W.2d 299 (1986).
125. 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987).
126. ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 2.
127. 322 Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d 215 (1995), overruled by Aka, 344 Ark. 627, 42
S.W.3d 508.
128. Logan, 281 Ark. at 185, 662 S.W.2d at 809.
129. Id., 662 S.W.2d at 809.
130. Id., 662 S.W.2d at 809. The petition was granted, but the probate court later
vacated its order because it had been issued "for a dead fetus." Id., 662 S.W.2d at 809.
Subsequently, Cary Carpenter filed a second and third petition for the appointment of
an administrator. Id., 662 S.W.2d at 809.
131. Id. at 185-86, 662 S.W.2d at 809.
132. Id. at 186, 662 S.W.2d at 810. The appellant's issue was "whether an unborn
viable fetus or a viable fetus born dead as a direct result of trauma caused by negligence
or willful and wanton misconduct has a cause of action against the tortfeasor." Id., 662
S.W.2d at 810.
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mentioned in the constitutional provision concerning probate.' The
court explained that the wrongful death statute would determine
whether there was a right to maintain an action for the death of an
unborn child,'34 but the court declined to interpret the wrongful death
statute in an ex parte probate proceeding.'35
2. Carpenter v. Bishop
In Bishop, Mr. Carpenter, as father and next friend, filed suit
against the estate of his wife Sheryl Carpenter, alleging that her
negligence caused the death of the fetus. 13 6 The court held that it was
not necessary to decide whether a viable fetus born dead was consid-
ered a "person" who had a cause of action under the wrongful death
statute because the action was barred by the parental immunity
doctrine."'
133. Id., 662 S.W.2d at 810 (citing ARK. CONST. art. VII, § 34 (amended 1938); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 62-2004(b) (Bobbs-Merrill Repl. 1971)). Because the probate court did
not have specific authority to extend the probate code to unborn children, any attempt
to do so would be void. Id., 662 S.W.2d at 810 (citing Poe v. Case, 263 Ark. 488, 565
S.W.2d 612 (1978)).
134. Logan, 281 Ark. at 186, 662 S.W.2d at 810 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-906
to -910 (Bobbs-Merrill Repl. 1979)).
135. Id., 662 S.W.2d at 810. The court noted that the appellant did have the right to
raise the tort issue in an adversary proceeding. Id. at 187, 662 S.W.2d at 810.
136. 290 Ark. 424, 425, 720 S.W.2d 299, 299-300 (1986). The court took the factual
allegations of the complaint as true that Sheryl Carpenter negligently drove her car into
a bridge abutment, killing herself and the fetus. Id., 720 S.W.2d at 299-300. Mr.
Carpenter also filed a derivative suit on behalf of himself and the unborn child's
siblings. Id., 720 S.W.2d at 300.
137. Id., 720 S.W.2d at 300 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-906 to -910 (Bobbs-
Merrill Repl. 1979)). In jurisdictions recognizing parental immunity, a parent is
immune from liability for a negligence suit brought by his or her child. See Spears v.
Spears, 339 Ark. 162, 3 S.W.3d 691 (1999) (upholding parental immunity doctrine and
announcing intention to reexamine doctrine given appropriate opportunity); Thomas v.
Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 594 S.W.2d 853 (1980) (reaffirming doctrine regarding
unintentional torts and extending the doctrine to those acting in the place of parents);
Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938) (holding that an uneman-
cipated minor had no cause of action against a parent for an unintentional tort); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 754 (7th ed. 1999). But see Attwood v. Estate of Atwood, 276 Ark.
230, 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982) (holding that doctrine did not apply to father who
intentionally got drunk and wrecked his car, causing injury to his child); Brown v. Cole,
198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939) (holding that parental immunity doctrine did not
apply to father who intentionally poisoned his son).
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3. Meadows v. State
In 1987 the Arkansas Supreme Court considered whether an
unborn viable fetus was a "person" within the manslaughter statute.' 38
In Meadows, an intoxicated Robert Keith Meadows crashed his car,
killing the unborn viable fetus of a passenger riding in his car.'39
Meadows was convicted of manslaughter for killing the unborn fetus. 40
In his appeal, Meadows argued that the manslaughter statute did not
include the reckless killing of a fetus. 4 ' The court found merit in this
argument, noting that the manslaughter statute referred to recklessly
causihg the death of another "person," and that the statute did not
include a definition of a "person.' ' 42 The court held that it must look to
common law when construing undefined terms, and because an unborn
fetus was not included within the definition of "person" at common
law, an unborn fetus could not be included within the definition of
"person" in the manslaughter statute. 143 In addition, the court noted that
an early feticide statute, which allowed a manslaughter charge for the
killing of an unborn fetus, had been expressly repealed, indicating that
the legislature had not intended to include fetus within the definition of
"person" in the manslaughter statute. 44
The court pointed to fundamental policy reasons that made it
appropriate to defer to the legislative branch. 45 The court reasoned that
the General Assembly had the primary authority to create new crimes,
and because General Assembly members were elected at frequent
138. See Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 107, 722 S.W.2d 584, 585 (1987).
139. Id., 722 S.W.2d at 585. Robert Keith Meadows crossed the center line of the
highway and struck a car driven by Randy Waldrip. Id., 722 S.W.2d at 585. Waldrip
was also killed in the accident. Id., 722 S.W.2d at 585. The appellant was convicted of
manslaughter in the death of Waldrip. Id., 722 S.W.2d at 585.
140. Id., 722 S.W.2d at 585.
141. Id., 722 S.W.2d at 585.
142. Id., 722 S.W.2d at 585.
143. Id. at 107-08, 722 S.W.2d at 585. The State urged the court to alter the common
law and create a new common law crime. Id. at 108, 722 S.W.2d at 585. The court
declined to create a new common law crime, noting that the court's practice was to
defer to the General Assembly's creation of crimes. Id. at 109, 722 S.W.2d at 586.
144. Meadows, 291 Ark. at 111, 722 S.W.2d at 587 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-
2223 (Bobbs-Merrill Repl. 1964)). The repealed statute provided that "the willful
killing of an unborn, quick child, by any injury to the mother of such child, which
would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be adjudged
manslaughter." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2223 (Bobbs-Merrill Repl. 1964); see Tiner v.
State, 239 Ark. 819, 826, 394 S.W.2d 608, 613 (1965) (upholding the defendant's
manslaughter conviction for killing an unborn child after defendant repeatedly struck
a pregnant woman with his car).
145. Meadows, 291 Ark. at 109, 722 S.W.2d at 586.
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intervals, they were more representative of the public will than was the
court.'46 Also, the General Assembly would be able to conduct hearings
to anticipate all factual situations which may occur, while the court, if
it created a new common law crime, would be limited to making a
ruling based solely on the facts of the proceeding before it.'47 Thus, the




Arkansas voters passed Amendment 68 in 1988, reflecting "the
stated public policy of Arkansas."' 4 9 Amendment 68 provides that
"[t]he policy of Arkansas is to protect the life of every unborn child
from conception until birth, to the extent permitted by the Federal
Constitution."' 50 Abortion providers challenged the constitutionality of
Amendment 68, arguing that the Amendment was inconsistent with the
Hyde Amendment of 1994.5 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas agreed and enjoined the enforcement of
Amendment 68 in its entirety.' The Eighth Circuit affirmed,'53 but the
United States Supreme Court reversed the "blanket invalidation" of
Amendment 68.14 Thus, Amendment 68 could stand as long as it did
not violate federal law.
155
146. Id., 722 S.W.2d at 586.
147. Id., 722 S.W.2d at 586.
148. Id. at 111, 722 S.W.2d at 587.
149. Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627, 640, 42 S.W.3d 508, 517 (2001).
150. ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 2.
151. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., P.A. v. Dalton, 860 F. Supp. 609, 612-13
(E.D. Ark. 1994), affd, 60 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1995), rev'd in part, 516 U.S. 474 (1996).
Section 1 of Amendment 68 provides that "[n]o public funds will be used to pay for any
abortion, except to save the mother's life." ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 1. The Hyde
Amendment bans federal funding for abortions except when necessary to save the life
of the mother or in cases of rape or incest. Dalton, 60 F.3d at 502-03.
152. Dalton, 860 F. Supp. at 628, 631.
153. Dalton, 60 F.3d at 503.
154. Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476 (1996).
However, the United States Supreme Court accepted as correct the district court's
interpretation of the Hyde Amendment. Id.
155. Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627, 640, 42 S.W.3d 508, 517 (2001).
Under federal law, a state's interest in protecting the life of a fetus begins at viability.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S.
113, 164-65 (1973) ("[Tlhe State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother."). A viable fetus is an "[u]nborn child who is capable of independent
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5. Chatelain v. Kelley
In an issue of first impression in Arkansas, the Chatelain court was
asked to determine whether the death of a fetus could be considered the
"death of a person" in the context of the state's wrongful death
statute.'56 In Chatelain, the plaintiff was admitted to a hospital to deliver
her child.'57 Dr. Lawrence A. Kelley performed an emergency C-
section, and the child was stillborn. 5 8 The plaintiff and her husband
sued the hospital for wrongful death, alleging that the child was
stillborn due to Dr. Kelley's delay in operating.'59 Citing prior cases,
the court reasoned that to include a fetus within the definition of
"person" for the purpose of the wrongful death statute would create an
inconsistency with the criminal and probate codes of the State. 6
Therefore, the court held that an unborn fetus was not included within





In Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass'n 6 2 the Arkansas Supreme Court
broke with precedent and determined that a viable fetus is included
within the definition of "person" in the Arkansas wrongful death
statute.163 The majority began by examining the court's prior holding
in Chatelain v. Kelley."6
existence outside his or her mother's womb, even if only in an incubator." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990).
156. Chatelain v. Kelley, 322 Ark. 517, 518, 910 S.W.2d 215, 216 (1994), overruled
byAka, 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508.
157. Id. at 517, 910 S.W.2d at 215.
158. Id. at 518, 910 S.W.2d at 215.
159. Id.,910S.W.2dat215.
160. Id. at 525, 910 S.W.2d at 219.
161. Id. at 518, 910 S.W.2d at 215 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102 (Michie
Supp. 1993)).
162. 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001).
163. See id. at 641, 42 S.W.3d at 518. Chief Justice Arnold wrote the majority
opinion, in which Justices Glaze, Corbin, and Hannah joined. Id. at 632, 42 S.W.3d at
512. Justice Imber wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 649, 42 S.W.3d at 523. Justice
Brown wrote an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part, which Justice
Thornton joined. Id. at 652, 42 S.W.3d at 525.
164. Id. at 637, 42 S.W.3d at 515.
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In Chatelain, the court held that a viable fetus was not a "person"
within the wrongful death statute. 165 The court revisited three specific
cases that were discussed or relied upon in Chatelain.'66 Citing Carpenter
v. Logan,167 Carpenter v. Bishop,168 and Meadows v. State,169 the Chatelain
court held that including a fetus within the definition of "person" would
"create an inconsistency in the laws of this State by holding 'person'
included viable fetus for the purpose of the wrongful death statute
when we have reached the contrary conclusion in the criminal law and
the law of probate." 70
However, the Aka court recognized that the Chatelain decision
"invited a legislative response" concerning the definition of "person."171
In addition, the Aka court noted that the General Assembly responded
by adding "unborn child" to the definition of "person" under the
criminal code. 72 The Aka court deemed the legislature's new statutory
definition to be especially relevant to the instant case because prior
decisions that did not afford protection to a viable fetus were based
heavily on the lack of a statutory definition of "person."' 73 Because the
General Assembly had acted, the Aka court was "no longer constrained
by the common-law definition of person.'
174
Next, the court addressed the public policy of Arkansas as stated
in Amendment 68 of 1988, opining that the new statutory definition of
"person" was consistent with the amendment.'75 Section 2 of Amend-
165. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 525, 910 S.W.2d at 219; see supra Part III.D.5.
166. Aka, 344 Ark. at 638,42 S.W.3dat 515-16.
167. 281 Ark. 184, 662 S.W.2d 808 (1984). In Logan, the court declined to hold that
an unborn or stillborn fetus was a "person" as defined in the probate code. Id. at 186,
662 S.W.2d at 810; see supra Part III.D.l.
168. 290 Ark. 424, 720 S.W.2d 299 (1986). The Bishop court did not address
whether a fetus was a "person" because the suit was barred by the parental-immunity
doctrine. Id. at 425, 720 S.W.2d at 300; see supra Part III.D.2.
169. 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987). The court held that a fetus was not a
"person" under manslaughter law, and it noted that because the court had to rely on the
common law definition of "person." Id. at 107-08, 722 S.W.2d at 585; see supra Part
III.D.3.
170. Aka, 344 Ark. at 638, 42 S.W.3d at 516 (quoting Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 525, 910
S.W.2d at 219).
171. Id. at 639, 42 S.W.3d at 516 (citing Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 525, 910 S.W.2d at
219).
172. Id. at 639, 42 S.W.3d at 516. Specifically, the General Assembly amended
section 5-1-102 of the Arkansas Code, adding that a '"person' also includes an unborn
child in utero at any stage of development." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B)(i)(a)
(LEXIS Supp. 2001).
173. Aka, 344 Ark. at 639-40,42 S.W.3d at 517.
174. Id. at 640, 42 S.W.3d at 517.
175. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 517.
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ment 68 states that Arkansas's public policy is to "protect the life of
every unborn child to the extent permitted by the Federal
Constitution."' 76 The court recognized the challenge to Amendment 68,
but it noted that the United States Supreme Court held that it would
enjoin Amendment 68 only if it conflicted with federal law.'77 The Aka
court recognized Amendment 68 as a "compelling expression of
Arkansas's public policy 'to the extent' it [did] not violate federal
law.'
178
Stressing the importance of avoiding inconsistency in the law and
citing the current legislative intent, the court noted that following the
submission of the appeal in the instant case, the Arkansas General
Assembly amended section 16-62-102(a) of the Arkansas Code to
include a viable fetus within the definition of "person" for wrongful
death actions."' The court also recognized that the General Assembly
included a deceased viable fetus within the definition of "decedent"
under the probate code. 80
In addition, the court held that the decision to overrule Chatelain
applied retroactively to the instant appellant and prospectively to
causes of action arising after the instant case. 8 ' The court stated that it
generally presumes that the legislature intends that statutes and
amendments be applied prospectively, but in the case of remedial
legislation the presumption did not ordinarily apply. 82 The court wrote
that a majority of jurisdictions have held that wrongful death statutes
are remedial statutes that require liberal interpretation in order to deter
harmful conduct and compensate injured persons. 83 The court cited
earlier decisions where it held that retroactive application was
appropriate for remedial statutes when such application did not disturb
rights or create new obligations, but supplied a more appropriate
176. ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 2.
177. Aka, 344 Ark. at 640, 42 S.W.3d at 517 (citing Dalton v. Little Rock Family
Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476 (1996) (holding that "state law is displaced only 'to
the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law'); Little Rock Family Planning
Servs. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1995) (enjoining the enforcement of Amendment
68 and holding it unconstitutional because the provision prohibiting the use of public
funds to pay for abortions, except to save the life of the mother, violated the Hyde
Amendment of 1994)).
178. Id. at 641, 42 S.W.3d at 517 (quoting Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning
Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476 (1996)).
179. Id. at 641 n.4, 42 S.W.3d at 518 n.4.
180. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 518 n.4.
181. Id. at643,42 S.W.3dat 519.
182. Id. at 641-42,42 S.W.3d at 518.
183. Aka, 344 Ark. at 642,42 S.W.3d at 518.
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remedy to an existing right or obligation.'84 The court held that
retroactive application was an appropriate way to reward the appellant
for "bring[ing] about a needed change in the law."'185 Thus, the court
overruled Chatelain v. Kelley'86 and held that a viable fetus was a
"person" within the meaning of Arkansas's wrongful death statute.'87
B. Minority Opinions
Justice Imber agreed with the result in the majority opinion, but
she disagreed with the majority's interpretation of legislative intent in
the amended homicide statute.'88 She noted that the amended homicide
statute was passed three years after the death of Baby Boy Aka, and
that the amended statute contained no provision for retroactive
application. 189 In addition, Justice Imber wrote that the majority was
relying on the legislative intent of a criminal code, not a remedial
source. 9 ° She argued that the majority improperly "bootstrap [ped] the
legislative intent in the definition of 'person"' under the criminal code
to the definition of "person" in the wrongful death statute. 9 '
Justice Imber concluded by stating that the more "compelling"
reason for overruling the holding in Chatelain was the public policy
stated in Amendment 68.92 She reasoned that the majority could have
relied on the purpose of Amendment 68-to protect fetal life from
conception until birth to the extent allowed by federal law-to justify
including a viable fetus within the definition of "person."' 93
184. Id, 42 S.W.3d at 518-19 (citing Bean v. Office of Child Support Enforcement,
340 Ark. 286, 297, 9 S.W.3d 520, 526 (2000)).
185. Id. at 643, 42 S.W.3d at 519 (citing Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1254, 429
S.W.2d 45, 52 (1968) (noting that remedial application "serves, in keeping with our
system of the private enforcement of legal rights, to reward the present plaintiff for her
industry, expense and effort, and for having given this Court the opportunity to rid the
body of our law of this unjust rule."), superseded by statute as stated in Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Thomas, 333 Ark. 655, 971 S.W.2d 244 (1998)). The court further stated that
"were the exception not applicable to the litigant urging departure from precedent, there
would be no reason for such a party to devote the required time, effort, and money to
raise an attack upon existing unsound precedents." Id. at 642-43, 42 S.W.3d at 519.
186. 322 Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d 215 (1995), overruled by Aka v. Jefferson Hosp.
Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001).
187. Aka, 344 Ark. at 641,42 S.W.3d at 518.
188. Id. at 649, 42 S.W.3d at 523 (Imber, J., concurring) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. §
5-1-102 (LEXIS Repl. 1999)).
189. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 523 (Imber, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 649-50, 42 S.W.3d at 524 (Imber, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 650, 42 S.W.3d at 524 (Imber, J., concurring).
192. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 524 (Imber, J., concurring).
193. Aka, 344 Ark. at 651, 42 S.W.3d at 525 (Imber, J., concurring).
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Justice Brown also agreed with the overruling of Chatelain, but he
disagreed with the retroactive application of the decision to the Aka
case. 94 He wrote that the majority opinion rendered the Chatelain
decision effective for only six days, thus two cases with comparable
facts could be treated differently within a six-day time period.'95 Justice
Brown opined that without legal stability, the court would be forced to
render opinions on a case-by-case basis.'96
Justice Brown criticized the majority's explanation of the change
in the public policy of Arkansas.'97 He cited the majority's reference to
four different events indicating a change in public policy: (1) Amend-
ment 68 as passed in 1988; (2) Amendment 68 as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court; (3) Act 1273 of 1999, which included
unborn children of twelve weeks or greater within the definition of
"person" for purposes of homicide law; and (4) Act 1265 of 2001,
which included a viable fetus within the definition of "person" for
purposes of wrongful death actions. 198 Justice Brown questioned why
the majority applied the decision only to the Aka case and all future
decisions if the state's public policy changed as early as 1988.'
Justice Brown disagreed with the majority's decision to apply the
Aka holding retroactively to only one case. 20 He stated that none of the
authorities cited in the majority opinion allowed the "overruling of a
case earlier than the date that the legislative act that changed the State's
public policy became effective. 20'
In addition, Justice Brown did not agree with the majority's
reasoning that the plaintiff should be rewarded for his part in overruling
Chatelain.0 2 In Justice Brown's opinion, the General Assembly, not the
194. Id. at 652, 42 S.W.3d at 525 (Brown, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
195. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 526 (Brown, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). The
Chatelain decision became final on December 7, 1995, and Baby Boy Aka was stillborn
on December 13, 1995. Id. at 653, 42 S.W.3d at 526 (Brown, J., dissenting in part,
concurring in part). "The Chatelain case must hold the record in the history of
jurisprudence as the case with the shortest life span." Id., 42 S.W.3d at 526 (Brown, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part).
196. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 526 (Brown, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). Brown
wrote that the lack of precedent "flies in the face of the whole notion of the common
law and stare decisis." Id., 42 S.W.3d at 526 (Brown, J., dissenting in part, concurring
in part).
197. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 526 (Brown, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
198. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 526-27 (Brown, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
199. Aka, 344 Ark. at 654, 42 S.W.3d at 527 (Brown, J., dissenting in part,
concurring in part).
200. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 527 (Brown, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
201. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 527 (Brown, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
202. Id. at 655, 42 S.W.3d at 527 (Brown, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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Aka case, changed the public policy of the state through legislative
acts.203 In conclusion, Justice Brown wrote that he would apply the
instant decision only from the date the General Assembly amended the
wrongful death statute to include fetuses within the definition of
,,person.,, °
V. SIGNIFICANCE
By allowing fetal recovery under the Arkansas wrongful death
statute, the Arkansas Supreme Court has given a viable fetus the legal
rights of a person. While the holding in Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass 'n
205
only applies to wrongful death actions in Arkansas, the court's
willingness to recognize a fetus as a "person" may foreshadow changes
in other areas of Arkansas law regarding fetal rights. Currently,
Arkansas regards an unviable fetus as a "person" under the criminal
code and a viable fetus as a "person" under the probate code and the
wrongful death statute. However, Arkansas's abortion statute regards
neither an unviable fetus nor a viable fetus as a "person. 20 6 In effect,
a fetus has multiple identities, and the personhood status of a fetus
varies, depending on where it is addressed in the Arkansas Code.
A major reason for the Aka court's holding was the court's desire
to avoid inconsistency in the law.207 However, the court's reliance on
the legislative intent of the criminal code did not avoid inconsistency,
and arguably, such reliance created additional inconsistency. When
determining whether to overrule Chatelain, the Aka court could have
limited its discussion to the recently amended wrongful death statute.
Instead, the court relied heavily upon prior legislative intent to justify
its decision. The court noted that it had invited a legislative response
in Chatelain, and that the legislature responded by amending section 5-
1-102 of the Arkansas Code to include an "unborn child" within the
definition of "person" for the purposes of the criminal code.208 As
Justice Imber points out in her concurring opinion, the amended
definition of "person" in the criminal code "does little to support the
majority's decision that the legislature intended personhood to begin at
203. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 527 (Brown, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
204. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 527 (Brown, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
205. 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001).
206. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-702(3) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). A viable fetus is
defined as "a fetus which can live outside the womb." Id.
207. SeeAka, 344 Ark. at 641,42 S.W.3d at 518.
208. Id. at 639, 42 S.W.3d at 516.
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viability."2 °9 Section 5-1-102 of the Arkansas Code grants personhood
status to an "unborn child," which is defined as a "living fetus of
twelve (12) weeks or greater gestation., 20 The Aka court recognized a
"viable fetus" as a "person," and according to the Arkansas Code, a
fetus becomes viable at the "end of the twenty-fifth week of preg-
nancy. ' '21I Thus, the Aka court relied on a statute that gives protection
to an unviable fetus to justify its decision to give protection to a viable
fetus.
212
While the court relies on legislative intent to avoid inconsistency,
it does not address the blatant inconsistency remaining after Aka within
the provisions of the Arkansas Code. The court's call for consistency
in the law could be used as an argument to make all statutory defini-
tions of "person" consistent within the Arkansas Code. If so, a revision
of the Arkansas abortion statute may be forthcoming.
Pro-choice advocates fear that the Aka decision will have an
adverse effect on the reproductive rights of women.
2 1 3 In Roe v. Wade,2 14
the United States Supreme Court held that a fetus did not have
personhood status under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, but the Court did recognize that some states
regarded a fetus as a person in other areas of the law. 215 Abortion
advocates argue that states giving personhood status to a fetus set up a
conflict with the holding in Roe, and the conflict will provide abortion
opponents with an argument to overrule Roe.2 16
209. Id. at 649 n.5, 42 S.W.3d 523 n.5 (Imber, J., concurring).
210. ARK. CODEANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B)(i)(b) (LEXIS Supp. 1999).
211. Id. § 20-16-703 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
212. After it discussed section 5-1-102 of the Arkansas Code, the court referred to
Act 1265 of 2001 and explained that the court must follow "current expression of
legislative intent." Aka, 344 Ark. at 641, 42 S.W.3d at 518. It should be noted, however,
that the court's discussion of the "current expression of legislative intent" is limited to
one footnote in the Aka decision, suggesting that the inclusion of the recent legislative
amendment in the opinion was merely an afterthought. See id. at 641 n.4, 42 S.W.3d at
518 n.4.
213. See James Jefferson, Fetus-As-Person Ruling Fires Abortion Debate, THE COM.
APPEAL, May 12, 2001, at B3, available at 2001 WL 19313791 (citing Laurie Smith, a
spokesperson for Planned Parenthood of Arkansas and Eastern Oklahoma).
214. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
215. Id. at 161-62.
216. See Vincent J. Schodolski, When Exactly Do Human Cells Become a Person?
Science Reshapes the Struggle over Abortion and the Legal Status of the Unborn, CHI. TRIB.,
May 10, 2000, at 1 (citing Heather Boonstra, senior public policy associate at the Alan
Guttmacher Institute). Heather Boonstra disagrees with giving a fetus legal status,
noting that "'[t]he purpose of 'personifying' the fetus . . . is to set up an inevitable
conflict, conceptually and legally between a woman's right to choose abortion, as
defined by . . . Roe vs. Wade, and a fetus' 'right to life."' Id.; see also William E.
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Arkansas Right to Life, in an amicus curiae brief filed with the Aka
court, argues that the term "person refers to all who share a common
human nature" and that for "the legislature to use the word person to
refer to some human beings but not others, it would be indulging in a
fiction., 217 Though the brief was filed to argue that Chatelain v. Kelley
2 8
should be overruled, abortion opponents offer the same argument to
support their view that Roe should be overruled.219
Those who disfavor statutory definitions that give legal status to
fetuses argue that such definitions are a "back-door method" to
overruling Roe and that regarding a fetus as a "person" could have other
effects on reproductive law.22' For example, if a state gives legal status
to a fetus, it could follow that a state would give legal status to an
embryo. 221 If so, states may have a duty to protect frozen embryos.
222
Buelow III, Comment, To Be and Not To Be: Inconsistencies in the Law Regarding the Legal
Status of the Unborn Fetus, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 963, 968 (1998) (stating that the Court's
finding that an unbom fetus was not a person was essential to the holding in Roe).
Justice Blackmun acknowledged the importance of personhood status under the
Fourteenth Amendment, noting that "[i]f this suggestion of personhood is established,
the [argument that a woman has a right to an abortion], of course, collapses, for the
fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment." Roe, 410
U.S. at 156-57.
217. Brief of Amicus Curiae Arkansas Right to Life, Inc. at 6, 12-13, Aka v.
Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627,42 S.W.3d 508 (2001) (No. 99-1366).
218. 322 Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d 215 (1995), overruled by Aka v. Jefferson Hosp.
Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627, 42 S.W.3d 508 (2001).
219. See Jefferson, supra note 213, at B3 (citing Rose Mimms, director of Arkansas
Right to Life). Mimms stated that the Aka ruling supports Right to Life's argument that
Roe should be overthrown. Id. Noting the different definitions of "person," Mimms said:
These laws just help underscore the fact that this is a human being. This
country is very conflicted. We say [a fetus] is a person. It can be a victim of
a crime. But if a woman wants to go have that child killed, she has a right to
go and do that. If it's a person, it should be protected. Someday, maybe our
country will come to grips with that and reverse Roe vs. Wade.
Id.
220. Joseph Gerth, 2001 Kentucky General Assembly: Wrongful-Death Bill Calls Fetus
a Person, Author Says It's Not Meant To AidAbortion Foes, THE COURIER-J., Feb. 21, 2001,
at IB, available at 2001 WL 9441414 (quoting Beth Wilson, director of the American
Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky's Reproductive Freedom Project); see also
Schodolski, supra note 216, at 1.
221. See Schodolski, supra note 216, at 1 (citing Gloria Banks, Associate Professor
of Law at Widener University).
222. Id. Professor Banks discussed potential effects on reproductive law, asking,
"Would [embryos] become wards of the state? Would the state have to provide care and
protection for the embryos?" Id. Professor Banks argued that states that give legal status
to a fetus "are diminishing the rights of the pregnant women and increasing the rights
of a two-cell entity. You are putting them on the same level." Id.
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This scenario may become reality if courts continue to broaden the
statutory definition of "person."
Some scholars and lawmakers disagree with the notion that fetal
protection statutes threaten the holding in Roe.223 However, abortion
opponents are encouraged by laws that define a fetus as a "person,"
arguing that the states' recognition of a fetus as a person "will weaken
and ultimately overthrow Roe., 224 With the election of Republican
George W. Bush to the presidency in 2000 and the possibility that
President Bush could nominate one or more United States Supreme
Court justices during his term in office, abortion opponents are
particularly encouraged about a Roe reversal. 225 Anti-abortion groups
are aware of a potential change in the makeup of the Supreme Court,
and they are working to change state laws that define "person., 226 They
hope to "define personhood as beginning the moment an egg is
fertilized.
2 7
Changes in the statutory definition of "person" could upset the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Roe.228 If a survey of the
223. See Robbins, supra note 99, at 95-96; Gerth, supra note 220, at lB (quoting
Republican Senator Elizabeth Tori, who supported a Kentucky bill in favor of allowing
wrongful death actions for fetuses, stating, "I really believe it's a stretch to say it's a
foot in the door to overturning Roe vs. Wade"). Arkansas Representative Chaney
Taylor, the sponsor of the house bill to allow wrongful death actions on behalf of viable
fetuses, stated that his bill had "nothing to do with abortion." Michael R. Wickline, Bill
Defines Viable Fetus as Person in Some Suits, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 5, 2001, at
B2 (quoting Representative Chaney Taylor). Rita Sklar, the Executive Director of the
Arkansas chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, agreed that Taylor's bill would
likely not pose a threat to legal abortions in Arkansas, but she explained that the ACLU
always opposes legislation granting personhood status to a fetus because it is viewed
as an attempt to provide "legal rights for a fetus that could be asserted against the
mother." Id. (quoting Rita Sklar, Executive Director of the Arkansas chapter of the
ACLU). Morgan Welch, attorney for Philip Aka, did not view the Aka case as one
having any bearing on abortion rights in Arkansas. Hannity & Colmes: Battle Zone: Is
Killing a Fetus Murder? (Fox News television broadcast, May 17, 2001), available at 2001
WL 5076082. Welch, who stated that he is "basically pro-choice," acknowledges that
regarding a fetus as a "person" in some areas creates inconsistencies in the law, but
notes that "law and people, hopefully, are growing things and can adapt." Id.
224. Schodolski, supra note 216, at 1 (quoting David O'Steen, Executive Director
of the National Right to Life Committee).
225. Id. David O'Steen stated:
I firmly believe that the day will come when there will be a majority of at
least five intellectually honest justices on the Supreme Court who will
recognize that there is nothing in the Constitution to prohibit states from
regulating abortion and strike Roe and return this matter to the people.
Id. (quoting David O'Steen).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Kim Gandy, President of the National Organization for Women, believes that
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states' laws reveals that a majority of states define a fetus as a "per-
son," the Court may decide to redefine the meaning of "personhood"
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Thus, the Aka decision could ultimately play a role in eroding a
woman's right to choose.
Stressing the need for consistency, the court redefined "person"
under the Arkansas wrongful death statute and thereby created an
inconsistency with Arkansas's abortion statute. If the court continues
to work toward consistency regarding the definition of "person," a
woman's right to choose may soon be in jeopardy.
Raina Weaver
states' statutory changes in the definition of "person" could ultimately determine the
way the United States Supreme Court defines "person," particularly if Roe is reversed.
The O'Reilly Factor: Unresolved Problem: Pregnant Couple Sues Doctor for Lost Fetus (Fox
News television broadcast, May 11, 2001), available at LEXIS, Tr. No. 051104cb.256.
* J.D. expected May 2002. B.S.E. in English, University of Central Arkansas.
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